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“Right to Work” Legislation: A Meaningless Choice that Constricts Union Operations 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 A current trend among the states is the adoption of “right to work” laws.1 Today, twenty-
eight states adopted right to work laws, with other states likely to follow suit.2 These laws, 
although varying in minor aspects, all stipulate that the prospective employment of an individual 
cannot be conditioned on their approval of joining a union.3 Right to Work laws further mandate 
that employers can no longer condition employment on the acceptance of union membership.4  
 Proponents of right to work laws find their statutory support in NLRA Sections 8(a)(3) 
and 14(b).5 The foundation of right to work laws is found in Section 8(a)(3), which states that “it 
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer… by discrimination in regard to hire… to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.”6 This statutory language echoes 
the purpose of right to work laws, which is to give prospective employees a choice regarding 
their union membership. Furthermore, the NLRA states in Section 14(b) that “nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.”7 The statutory language is 
clear in conveying a choice regarding union membership to prospective laborers. States are 
adopting this principle through right to work laws, and the trend is gaining momentum.8 
                                                     
1 NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states/ (last visited Oct. 2, 
2017). 
2 Id.  
3 Erin Shannon, Right-to-Work: What it is and How it Works, WASHINGTON POLICY CENTER (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/right-to-work-what-it-is-and-how-it-works. 
4 Id. 
5 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2014).   
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Shannon, supra note 3.  
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 The problem that arises from the implementation of “right to work” laws is that it puts 
unions in a financial bind. This financial bind stems from when a union chooses to utilize their 
exclusive representation option.9 When a union acts as the exclusive bargaining representation, 
they must represent all workers in a labor force.10 Unions will negotiate contracts for dues paying 
members, and unaffiliated employees when acting as the exclusive negotiator.11 Yet, unions only 
receive compensation from the dues paying members, and the unaffiliated employees enjoy the 
benefit of the negotiations while not paying for the union’s services.12 In effect, the unaffiliated 
employees enjoy a “free rider” experience.13 
 Currently, the courts are diverging on whether this free rider experience amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause.14 One view, supported by 
the 7th Circuit, holds that unions are compensated through their exclusive bargaining power.15 
The opposition, which originates from Judge Wood’s dissent in Sweeney, argues that non-
members must pay for union services.16 Judge Wood asserts that if non-members are not 
required to pay for these services, then a free-rider system will persist.17 Such a free rider system 
is a Takings Clause issue, because unions will not receive just compensation for their expensive 
services.18 This view is receiving growing support from various trial courts in the country.19  
                                                     
9 Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actor’s Equity and the Closed Shop Dilemma, 96 Colum. 
L. Rev. 178, 190 (1996).  
10 Meredith, supra note 10.  
11 Meredith, supra note 10.  
12 Shannon, supra note 3.  
13 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 683 (Wood, Dissenting).  
14 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671; Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
15 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666. 
16 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 683, 684 (Wood, Dissenting).  
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Int’l Ass’n, 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1.  
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 This Note argues that the views expressed in Judge Wood’s dissent and various state trial 
courts is correct, and that “right to work” laws constitute an unjust taking under the Fifth 
Amendment Taking Clause. This note will first delve into the statutory framework supporting 
“right to work” laws. Next, this note will layout the various duties that accompany a union’s duty 
of exclusive representation, and its implications on public and private employees. After laying 
this foundation, this note will comment on the “right to work” laws interaction with the various 
employer-employee relationship constructions.  Next, this note will explore the present opposing 
views in the circuits. while also examining the various property interests associated with the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, this note will argue that unions have a valid 
interest in monetary compensation for their services. The right to work laws denial of union fees 
will promulgate a free rider system, and thus a Takings Clause violation.  
II. Background 
 Traditionally, union security agreements took one of three forms.20 These agreements are 
a closed shop, union shop, and an agency shop.21 Essentially, these three structures detail various 
ways in which employment relates to union membership.22 In a closed shop, an employer can 
only hire workers who “were members of the union representing the employer’s employees.”23 If 
the prospective employee resists joining the relevant union, then they are prohibited from 
employment.24 However, in a union shop agreement, non-union members may be hired, but 
continued employment is conditioned that all employees become union members within a 
                                                     
20 Meredith, supra note 10, at 186.  
21 Id. 
22 Ariana Levinson, Federal Preemption of Local Right-to-Work Laws, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS, 457, 463 (2017).   
23 Meredith, supra note 10, at 186.  
24 Id.  
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specified time frame.25 Lastly, agency shop agreements stipulate that non-union members may be 
hired, and are never required to join a union.26 Instead, workers in an agency shop must pay their 
fair share of union fees that stem from collective bargaining costs.27 
 The United States shifted from these traditional union security agreements by banning 
both closed shop and union shop agreements.28 First, the NLRA prohibited closed shop 
agreements, and limited the scope of union-shop agreements.29 Eventually, the NLRA declared 
union shops illegal under Section 8(a)(3), because of concerns associated with employees paying 
full dues, which would be used to finance a union’s political activities.30 Thus, the only 
permissible union security agreement is the agency shop.31 
Moreover, the NLRA was created as means to govern the collective bargaining process 
between unions and employers.32 The federal government hoped to encourage collective 
bargaining, thereby aiding the free-flow of commerce.33 The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 
strengthened NLRA Section 8(a) by prohibiting employers from influencing union 
membership.34 Here, the Amendments are reinforcing an employee’s rights under Section 7 of 
the NLRA to “self-organize or bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing.”35  
                                                     
25 Id. 
26 Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, Public Unions, 
and Free Speech, 20 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 341, 343 (2006).  
27 Id.  
28 Levinson, supra note 21, at 463; 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947). 
29 Communications Workers of Am. V Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 772-774 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947). 
30 Levinson, supra note 21, at 463; 29 U.S.C. §8(a)(3) (1947). 
31 Id. 
32 Holly R. Winefsky, Julie A. Tenney, Preserving the Garment Industry Proviso: Protecting Acceptable Working 
Conditions Within the Apparel and Accessories Industries, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 587, 592 (2002); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1935).  
33 Winefsky, supra note 28.  
34 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(3) (1947).  
35 29 U.S.C. § 7 (1947).  
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 Furthermore, strict union shop agreements are also prohibited due to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in General Motors.36 Union shop agreements that contained a thirty-day grace period 
still existed after the prohibition of closed shop agreements. But, in 1963, the Supreme Court in 
General Motors held that this thirty-day grace period was improper under the recent amendments 
to the NLRA.37 Essentially, the Supreme Court held that even in a union-shop agreement, a 
worker cannot be fired solely on their non-membership status.38 Thus, the Supreme Court limited 
the term “membership” in Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to its “financial core,” which 
encompasses solely the obligation to pay dues and fees.39  
 In a later decision, the Supreme Court whittled down on this “financial core” 
interpretation of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.40 Seeking to shift away from the political 
influence of unions, the Supreme Court limited agency fees to costs associated solely with the 
unions representational and collective-bargaining activities. Here, the “financial core” 
interpretation of General Motors is now further limited to only include a unions costs associated 
with representational activities.41 
 The result of the Beck limitation is the existence of agency shop agreements in modern 
labor law. Agency shop agreements abide by the Supreme Court’s limitations, and only warrant 
payment for a union’s representational activities.42 But, subsequent provisions of the NLRA 
provide alternate routes for state to limit the agency shop agreement permitted by Section 8(a)(3) 
of the NLRA.43 
                                                     
36 NLRA v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 742. 
40 Beck, 487 U.S. at 740.  
41 Id. 
42 Meredith, supra note 10. 
43 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 659. 
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Section 14 of the NLRA allows states to limit union security agreements.44 Specifically, 
the wording of Section 14(a) permits states to pass legislation regarding collective bargaining.45 
Section 14(a) states: “for the purpose of any law, either national or local.”46 This language is 
interpreted to mean that Congress expressly allows local ordinances to legislate collective 
bargaining.47 Moreover, Section 14(b) of the NLRA protects states rights, and reads as 
following: 
 “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution 
  or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization 
  as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such  
  execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”48 
 
 Courts interpret Section 14(b) of the NLRA as protecting a state’s ability to enact  
 
legislation that forbids union-security agreements which are allowed under Section 8(a)(3) of the 
NLRA.49 This interpretation of Section 14(b) gives states the choice to prohibit agency shop 
agreements.50 Many states are choosing to utilize this power by enacting “right to work” laws. 
 Additionally, this “financial core” interpretation is driven by a First Amendment concern, 
which stems from forcing non-union public employees to financially contribute to unions.51  
Forcing public employees to join unions triggers a potential violation of the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association.52 This potential violation resides in the unions position in 
collective bargaining activities, which can have drastic civic and political consequences.53 
                                                     
44 29 U.S.C. §14  (1947). 
45 Id. 
46 29 U.S.C. §14(a) (1947).  
47Levinson, supra note 21 at 476.  
48 29 U.S.C. §14(b) (1947).  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 669. 
52 Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012).  
53 Id.  
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Requiring an individual to financially support a union whose actions are politically adverse to 
their views impinges upon that person’s First Amendment rights.54  
After recognizing this First Amendment right, Abood held that these public employees 
are still required to pay fees associated with a union’s representational costs.55 The court held 
that service charges relating to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance 
adjustment are subject to an agency fee.56 Thus, agency shop agreements remain permissible for 
public employees, so long as the fees are related to representational services.  
Alternatively, the Supreme Court later limited Abood, and drew a distinction between 
public and private employees.57 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that this First Amendment 
right does not apply to private employees.58 Private employees do not possess the First 
Amendment rights that protect them from compulsory association and speech.59 Thus, private 
employees are subject to union shop agreements, where they may have to financially contribute 
to union activities that extend beyond their representational function.60  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court posits that a single representative prevents prospective 
confusion that would stem from the attempted enforcement of two or more agreements which 
stipulate conditions of employment.61 A single bargaining unit allows an employer to bargain 
with one entity, which provides an easier path to reach an agreement.62 This sentiment is further 
expressed in federal law.63 
                                                     
54 Id.  
55 Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 US 209, 226 (1977). 
56 Id.  
57 Harris v. Quinn, 134 U.S. 2618, 2638 (2014).  
58 Id. at 2644. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 221.  
62 Id. 
63 29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017). 
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Federal law implies that unions are better served to represent labor related actions.64 This 
implication stems from the laborers ability to vote unions as their exclusive representation.65 This 
federal grant essentially functions as a monopoly for unions, where a union is the only entity that 
can collectively bargain for all employees in a workforce.66 Involved in this federal grant is the 
union’s obligation to satisfy the duty of fair representation.67 The duty of fair representation 
forces unions to adequately serve the interests of all members in a workforce, regardless of their 
affiliation with a union.68 In other words, the duty of fair representation requires the union to 
represent both paying members and nonmembers.69  
 Although a union is still able to conduct members-only representation, chances are that 
unions will be designated as the exclusive-representation for laborers.70 In right to work states, 
non-union members will be grouped into this representation, and will not be forced to pay for 
union services.71 This presents a potential free-rider problem, where potential employees are 
incentivized to not contribute to a union.72 The duties of fair representation and federal duty of 
exclusive representation allows these non-members to reap the benefits regardless of their choice 
to pay into the union.73  
Criticisms are emerging about this free-rider problem, specifically whether it triggers the 
Takings Clause.74 In the 7th Circuit, Judge Wood’s dissent in Sweeney argued that the union’s 
                                                     
64 29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017). 
65 Id.  
66 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.  
67 Id. at 671 (Wood, dissenting).  
68 Id.; Abood, 431 US at 221. 
69 Id. 
70 29 U.S.C.S. §159(a) (2017).  
71 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666. 
72 Id at 673.  
73 Id. 
74 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 672 (Wood, dissenting). 
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uncompensated services amount to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause.75 Judge Wood asserts that unions suffer an unjust taking of property when 
forced to provide free services to non-members.76  
Judge Wood argues that the right to work laws exempt non-union employees from 
reimbursing unions for their services.77 Here, Judge Wood references Beck, and claims that 
federal law entitles unions to fees stemming from their representational duties.78 Judge Wood 
refutes the notion that paying representational services will cause nonmember to morph into 
members.79 Rather, union membership should be distinguished by the payments of initiation fees 
and monthly dues.80  
Moreover, Judge Wood argues that the majority creates a “free rider” problem by holding 
that the unions are justly compensated through their grant of exclusive representation.81 This 
“free rider” problem incentivizes employees to decline union membership, because they can reap 
the benefits of union services upon the commencement of a collective action.82 This “free-rider” 
implicates the Takings Clause, because right to work laws mandate unions to provide property to 
another private party.83 Judge Wood asserts that the Takings Clause is violated from this forced 
transfer of property without compensation.84 
                                                     
75 Id. 
76 Id at 671 (Wood, dissenting).  
77 Id at 674.  
78 Id at 676.  
79 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 678.  
80 Id at 674.  
81 Id at 670.  
82 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 673 (Wood, dissenting).   
83 Id. at 674.  
84 Id.  
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In making the Takings Clause argument,  Judge Wood references the different services 
unions provide.85 These services include filing grievances, investigations, arbitrations, and other 
duties.86 The costs of these services can easily be thousands of dollars.87 These uncompensated 
services force Judge Wood to focus on the seizure of money as a protected property interest 
when forming her Takings Clause analysis.88 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation and 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington support Judge Wood’s argument that money is a 
recognized property interest under the Takings Clause.89 
In Phillips, the court states that the interest accrued by funds in a lawyer-managed trust 
(IOLTA) accounts is the private property of the client.90 Furthermore, in Brown the court held 
that funds transferred from IOLTA accounts to a legal foundation qualifies as an action for a 
“public use” under the Takings Clause.91 Brown stated that the Takings Clause was violated if 
the clients were entitled to compensation.92 Compensation is measured by an individual’s 
pecuniary loss, not the recipient’s gain.93 Additionally, the public use prong is satisfied if a 
compelling public interest is served.94 In Brown, the petitioners suffered no net loss, and served 
the public interest by providing legal services to the needy.95 Taken together, the Supreme Court 
viewed that money was used for a public use, and implicitly acknowledged that money us a 
                                                     
85 Id at 675.  
86 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 
U.S. 216 (2003).  
90 Id. 
91 Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).  
92 Id. at 240. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 232.  
95 Id. at 240. 
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protected property interest. Also, these holdings collectively imply that money may be a 
protected property interest if an individual suffers a net loss.96 
Judge Wood’s dissent builds off the above-mentioned case law, and states that Indiana is 
forcing unions to donate their expensive services to nonmembers.97 In doing so, the dissent 
references Beck, which implied that nonmembers should pay for the benefits they receive from 
union representation.98 Judge Wood interprets Beck to mean that non-members can be compelled 
to pay for union services that they consume.99 
The popularity of Judge Wood’s dissent is evidenced by various state trial courts 
choosing to implement her argument rather than the Sweeney majority. The 14th Circuit of 
Wisconsin is one of the few courts to have followed Judge Wood’s reasoning in Sweeney.100 
Here, Wisconsin was dealing with a newly implemented right to work law.101 This state trial 
court followed Judge Wood’s reasoning to a tee, and even quotes from her dissent at length to 
arrive at their conclusion.102 The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin accepted the union’s claim that they 
have a legally protected property interest in services performed for both member and non-
members.103 This private property interest exists because unions must use funds from their 
treasury to promulgate these services.104 
Furthermore, the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin holds that the taking of union’s funds 
qualifies as a “public use” under the Takings Clause.105 Wisconsin legislators explained the 
                                                     
96 Brown, 538 U.S. at 240.  
97 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 674 (Wood, dissenting).  
98 Beck, 487 U.S. at 735. 
99 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 675 (Wood, dissenting). 
100 Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016) 
101 Id. at 3.   
102 Id. at 14, 15.  
103 Id. at 10.  
104 Id. 
105 Int’l Ass’n, 2016 Cir. LEXIS at 13.  
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purpose behind their newly enacted law to “make the business climate in the State more 
favorable by eliminating the power of labor organizations.”106 This purpose applies to all right to 
work laws, because their focus is to weaken the power unions have over business and labor. 
Under Takings Clause scrutiny, any private property seized by the government for a public use 
must be met with just compensation.107 Here, the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin echoes Judge Wood 
and holds that a public use exists, even though the property (services) is transferring from one 
private party to another.108 The court states that there is no principle where private property may 
be seized from one individual, and given to another for their private use and enjoyment.109  
The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin also accepts that a “free rider” problem exists and will 
persist if unions remain uncompensated for their services to nonmembers.110 The 14th Circuit 
essentially adopts Judge Wood’s argument verbatim.111 Wisconsin’s state trial court is the first to 
hold that a right to work law operates as an unconstitutional taking. Yet, preceding opinions have 
held that the proper set of facts could demonstrate how a union would suffer a deprivation of 
compensation for services provided.112 In Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2014), 
Justice Rucker’s concurring opinion intimated that it is possible for unions to succeed on an 
unjust taking claim.113 Justice Rucker explained that mandating unions to bear the cost of 
representing all employees presented the foundation of a Takings Claim.114  
                                                     
106 Id. 
107 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 674 (Wood, dissenting). 
108 Int'l Ass'n v. Wis., 2016 Cir. LEXIS at 13.  
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 15.  
111 Id. 
112 Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2014). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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The 14th Circuit of Wisconsin’s holding was stayed at the court of appeals; yet, it still 
has the effect of validating the arguments posed by Judge Wood and Justice Rucker.115 The 
validation of Judge Wood’s argument is evidenced by the further acceptance of her reasoning in 
additional jurisdictions.116 In W.Va. AFL-CIO v. Tomblin, the West Virginia State Trial Court 
sided with the unions, and awarded a preliminary injunction to block the states right to work 
law.117 The majority referenced Judge Wood’s “free-rider” argument, where allowing non-
paying laborers to reap the benefits of union services presents an unconstitutional taking.118 The 
court chose to recognize the serious constitutional harms to unions, and stated that these harms 
were serious enough to delay the implementation of West Virginia’s right to work law.119  
Although, Judge Wood’s argument has been met with growing acceptance, the opposition 
dominates. The majority in Sweeney that the unions were compensated for their services to 
nonmembers.120 Here, the union chose not to advance a Takings Clause argument.121 Yet, the 
majority reasoned that even if the union chose to advance the Takings Clause argument, they 
would face the challenge of proving how repealing Indiana’s right to work laws would provide 
an adequate remedy.122 It is federal law that enforces the duty of fair representation, and 
Indiana’s right to work laws only precludes unions from collecting fees in the performance of 
                                                     
115 William Welkowitz, Unions Using “Takings” Clause Arguments to Challenge Right-to-Work Laws, LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT BLOG, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.bna.com/unions-using-takings-
b73014448852/.  
116 W. Va. AFL-CIO v. Tomblin, 2017 W.V. Cir. LEXIS 2 (2017). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 17. 
119 Id. 
120 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666. 
121 Id. at 664.  
122 Id. at 666.  
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that federal duty.123 Thus, the court implied that the federal duty may need to reexamined, rather 
than repealing Indiana’s right to work law.124 
Moreover, the majority refuted the idea that unions have a protectable property interest in 
securing fees for services provided for non-members.125 The majority concluded that a union is 
justly compensated through “federal law’s grant to the union the right to exclusively bargain with 
an employer.”126 Here, the 7th Circuit states that a union’s right as the exclusive negotiator is just 
compensation for their provision of services to non-members.    
Additionally, the Northern District of Idaho sided with the majority in Sweeney, and 
rejected Judge Wood’s reasoning that right to work laws operate as an unconstitutional taking at 
the union’s expense.127 The court focused on the duty of fair representation proscribed by federal 
law.128 The duty of fair representation precluded the union’s claim that they suffer an unjust 
taking of property.129 The court held that the duty of fair representation only restricts the union 
from collecting fees that are meant to cover the expenses associated with the performance of 
their duty.130 The court also states that unions are justly compensated by their right to bargain 
exclusively with the employer.131 
The West Virginia Supreme Court also refutes the notion that unions suffer an 
unconstitutional taking of property by being prohibited from collecting fees from 
nonmembers.132 In Morrisey v. West Virginia, the court held that without a collective bargaining 
                                                     
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.  
126 Id. 
127 Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 370 v. Wasden, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1223 (D. Idaho, 2016).  
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO, 2017 WL 410375 (W. Va. 2017). 
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agreement, a union only has a “unilateral expectation of fees.”133 West Virginia defines a 
“property interest” as a right that must derive from either a private contract or a state law.134 
Furthermore, a protected property interest must be something more than a unilateral 
expectation.135 Thus, without a collective bargaining agreement, unions only have a unilateral 
expectation of fees from nonmembers.136 Lastly, the court asserts that no other appellate court 
has examined a Takings Clause challenge to a right to work law and accepted the union’s 
argument.137  
Various law review articles touch on periphery issues regarding this question.  Michael 
Hostetler explains that a bare desire for compensation does not amount to a recognized property 
interest.138 Yet, in a footnote, Hostetler states that the Supreme Court has not out rightly 
determined whether personal services constitute property under the Takings Clause.139 
Regardless, Hostetler looks to the interpretations of various lower courts, who hold that the 
“time, experience, and skill of a professional” amount to a protectable property interest.140  
Also, Howard Master examines the issue of whether labor is protected under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.141 Master argues that the labor expended by the wrongfully 
convicted should be judged under the Takings Clause.142 Furthermore, Master asserts that the 
                                                     
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Morrisey, 2017 WL 410375.  
138 Michael J. Hostetler, Intangible Property under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Takings Clause: A Case 
Study, 50 Duke L.J. 589 (2000). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Howard S. Master, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 97 (2004). 
142 Id. at 123.  
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exclusion of labor from the Takings Clause’s scrutiny is “manifestly reasonable.”143 He goes on 
to say that labor has long been regarded as a protected property right.144 
It is a long-standing principle that one’s labor constitutes a protected property interest, 
which deserves compensation.145 Yet, in right to work states, a distinction is made about the 
collection of union fees for representing nonmembers. The 7th Circuit asserts that it’s the union’s 
federal duty of fair representation which precludes them from receiving compensation.146 Courts 
have previously held that certain professions are not entitled to fees.147 The court held in United 
States v. Dillon that pro bono attorney services were not recognized under the Takings Clause.148 
The court reasoned that attorney’s fees are different from other professions, because attorney’s 
have a “civic duty” to represent indigents.149 Attorney’s, unlike other professions, have an 
ancient tradition of representing the impoverished when performing services as officers of the 
court.150 Thus, this civic duty rule operates as an exception to the general proposition that labor 
constitutes a protectable property interest.151 
Hostetler examines the civic duty rule and expands its scope to include activities on one’s 
property that depart from “existing rule or understandings.”152 A breach of one of these rules or 
understandings could be a usage of property that constitutes a nuisance, or where tradition states 
that the particular property use does not require compensation.153 Hostetler then asserts that 
                                                     
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.; Hostetler, supra note 74; DeLisio v. Alaska Super. Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 440 (Alaska 1987) (quoting Coffeyville   
Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 76 P. 848, 850 (Kan. 1904))  
146 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666. 
147 United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1965). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 635.  
151 Id.  
152 Hostetler, supra note 74 at 128.  
153 Id. 
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outside of civic duty implications, labor is a protected property interest where an individual is 
free to sell it for compensation.154The 7th Circuit, nor any Right to Work state has yet to justify 
their prohibition on unions receiving compensation through a civic duty analysis. Instead, these 
courts rely on the federal duties of fair representation and exclusive representation when 
mandating that unions must provide nonmembers free services. 
III. Analysis 
 Judge Wood rightfully asserts that “right to work” laws violate the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.155 The heart of Judge Wood’s argument is that unions should receive 
monetary compensation for their representational services. Agency shops embody this type of 
fee system, which are permissible under the NLRA.156 Although agency shops are permissible, 
states have the option to prohibit such a system under Section 8(a)(3) and Section 14(b) of the 
NLRA.157 States are increasingly utilizing this power by implementing “right to work” laws.158  
 Yet, Judge Wood’s contention arrives out of an externality of the right to work laws. This 
externality arises out of unions being forced to provide their services for free when operating as 
an exclusive representative.159 These representative services are expensive, easily costing 
thousands of dollars.160 Forcing the unions to swallow these immense financial costs triggers 
Takings Clause scrutiny, because the Supreme Court recognizes money as a protectable property 
interest.161 
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 The IOLTA cases expressed in the Sweeney dissent provide strong support that money is 
a property interest under the Takings Clause.162 The Supreme Court in Phillips states that interest 
income generated in a lawyer’s IOLTA account is viewed as private property of a client, and 
thus protected by the Takings Clause.163 The court refuted the government’s argument that 
private property was not implicated.164  Here, the court approached the property issue by 
searching for the creator of the value.165 The Supreme Court concluded that the interest was 
created from the client’s funds, rather than any government efforts.166  
Unlike the IOLTA accounts, the unions funds at stake here do not face the question of 
value origin. Furthermore, Phillips’ analysis assigned value to the funds, and would only deny 
Takings Clause protection if it was the government who created the value.167 Here, the value of 
the union funds is generated from their valuable representational services. The application of 
Phillips analysis to right to work states makes clear that the monetary expenses incurred by 
unions qualify as a protected property interest.       
 Moreover, Brown builds off the value of interest generated by IOLTA accounts, and 
takes it a step further by examining the Takings Clause issue.168 The Supreme Court held that 
transferring the monetary interest to a different owner is a per se taking, so long as it is for a legit 
public use.169 The right to work laws operate as a forced transfer of union funds from the union 
to nonmembers. Here, the duty of exclusive representation forces unions to expend their own 
resources when representing nonmembers. The duty of exclusive representation operates as a 
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forced transfer under Brown, because it forces the transfer of funds from one owner to another.170 
Furthermore, the duty of fair representation requires unions to give the same quality of services 
to nonmembers.171 The result is that nonmembers are receiving the same expensive services 
enjoyed by paying members.172 The original owner (unions) are forced to convert those funds 
into services, which are meant to benefit nonmembers. This practice operates as a transfer, and 
Brown articulated that a practice of this sort is subject to Takings Clause scrutiny,173 which 
requires payment to satisfy just compensation.174 
 Brown also explains that compensation is measured by an owner’s pecuniary loss, rather 
than the benefiting party’s gain.175 Unlike Brown, where there was no pecuniary loss to the 
clients, here, there is a clear harm to unions.176 The mandated services to nonmembers can cost 
unions thousands of dollars.177 This blatant pecuniary loss to unions deserves to be met with 
adequate compensation from nonmembers.  
 Both Brown and Phillips focus on the transfer of money as a private property interest, 
which is subject to Takings Clause scrutiny.178 Here, the unions provision of services is subject 
to Taking Clause scrutiny, because it involves the seizure money from a private party (unions), 
and transfers it to another private party (non-members), for a legitimate public use.179 The 
Supreme Court must step in, and classify the expenses associated with union services to 
nonmembers as an involuntary transfer of funds, thus subject to Takings Clause Scrutiny.  
                                                     
170 Id. 
171 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 666.  
172 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671 (Wood, Dissenting).  
173 Id at 674. 
174 Brown, 538 U.S. at 240 
175 Id. at 219. 
176 Id. 
177 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 671 (Wood, Dissenting).  
178 Brown, 538 U.S. at 235; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156. 
179 Brown, 538 U.S. at 240.  
 21 
 Brown also measures a “public use” by determining if there is a compelling public 
interest involved.180 Diverting the interest from the IOLTA funds to accounts used for providing 
legal services to the impoverished qualified as compelling public interest.181 Here, there is no 
justifiable public interest in providing free services to employees who decide against union 
membership.  There is no implication that nonmembers are suffer a financial disadvantage when 
compared to union members. Furthermore, the interest of having employees represented in one 
collective action would still be met if an agency fee is imposed on nonmembers.182 An agency 
fee would only require a nonmember to pay a union when they reap the benefits of union 
services.183 Thus, agency fees would still allow employees to retain their nonmember status.  
 Additionally, unions are not subject to special duties that may exist in other professions. 
In Dillon, the court held that attorney’s fees were not subject to Takings Clause scrutiny because 
lawyers have a “civic duty” to represent indigents.184 The “civic duty” of an attorney stems from 
the ancient and established tradition of the profession to represent those who are in need.185    
 Unlike Dillon, the unions effected by right to work laws have no civic duty to provide 
services to nonmembers. The only potential “civic duty” assigned to unions is attached to the 
federal mandates of fair and exclusive representation. Judge Wood explains that accompanied 
with the right of fair representation is the duty to “serve the interests of all members of the 
bargaining unit without hostility or discrimination, and to exercise its discretion with complete 
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good faith and honesty.”186 This is the only “civic duty” proscribed to unions. There is no 
mandate that unions execute this duty free of charge.  
 Yet, unions are implicitly coerced to represent all employees in an organization when 
undertaking representational duties. Unions have the option at the beginning of an action to 
represent only dues paying employees.187 This option fades away if the majority of laborers vote 
to have the union serve as their sole representative.188 Such a majority vote implicates the duty of 
exclusive representation.189 Thus, this federal mandate of exclusive representation essentially 
operates as a forced civic duty on unions to represent all employees in an entity. 
 Exclusive representation is a fundamental value in labor law, which can be viewed as a 
direct benefit to unions. Unions do not have to worry about competing with other representatives 
when operating as the exclusive negotiator.190 Unions essentially have a monopoly on contract 
negotiation/collective bargaining when operating as the exclusive negotiator.191 But, the benefit 
of exclusive representation comes into question when dealing with right to work laws. The 
advantage of exclusive representation backfires on unions, because they are forced to represent 
nonmembers without receiving payment.  
The reasoning behind this federal mandate can be best attributed to the government’s 
interest in convenience. Forcing the unions to represent all employees when the majority of 
workers deem it appropriate allows their collective voice to be met with one representative.192 
Removing competition between representatives from this dynamic increases the expedience of 
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collective labor actions, while also allowing employees to retrieve equal treatment. Without 
exclusive representation, only members would be represented by unions, while nonmembers 
would have to enter the open market and find individual representation.193 Such a practice would 
lead members and nonmembers being governed by different labor agreements. This result would 
cause harm in labor relations; thus, exclusive representation exists partly to curb such a harmful 
practice.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court already held that employees who are nonmembers can 
be compelled to compensate unions for their services.194 In Beck and Abood, the Supreme Court 
established a distinction between the services nonmembers should be responsible for, and fees in 
which they should retain an exemption.195 In their analysis of NLRA §8(a)(3), Beck and Abood  
held that nonmembers should be responsible for fees that are related to collective bargaining.196 
This holding reconciles the competing interests between unions who desire compensation, and 
nonmembers who wish to separate themselves from the political affiliations of a union.197 Unions 
would be compensated for costs associated with contract administration and collective 
bargaining, and would not receive compensation for unrelated activities.198 A straightforward 
application of Beck and Abood resolves the Takings Clause issue associated with right to work 
laws. Yet, the majority in Sweeney tweaked their application of this Supreme Court precedent.199 
The majority in Sweeney narrowly followed the Supreme Court, and construed the word 
“member” of NLRA §8(a)(3) and boiled the word down to “its financial core.”200 The majority 
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construed the financial core language to only amount to representation fees.201 After 
implementing NLRA §14(b)’s allowance of state laws that prohibit membership, the majority 
concluded that states can prohibit agreements that force employees to pay representation fees.202 
Judge Wood rejects this interpretation in her dissent, and argues that membership should be 
limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues.203 The dissent argues that 
nonmembers and members should be distinguished on these two payments.204 Furthermore, the 
dissent argues that nonmembers should be forced to pay dues when reaping the benefits from 
collective bargaining and contract administration.205  
In right to work states, a prospective employee’s decision to join a union, along with their 
payment of an initiation fee and monthly dues, should qualify them as a union member. Their 
continued membership should be solely reliant on their continued payment of these dues. Thus, 
when interpreting NLRA §14(b), the term “members” should be defined by one’s adherence to 
their dues payments. If one fails to meet their dues obligations, they will be classified as a 
nonmember. This nonmember status will then bring in the holding from Beck, which mandates 
that nonmembers pay representation fees associated with collective bargaining and contract 
administration.206  
Maintaining a bright line distinction between a “member” and “nonmember” is key to 
providing a fair environment to both employees and unions. Judge Wood criticizes the Sweeney 
majority for blurring the line between these two statuses.207 Her criticism is aimed at the 
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majority’s criterion for when a nonmember transforms into a member.208 The Sweeney majority 
essentially reclassifies a nonmember as a member if they are forced to pay any reimbursement 
for representation.209 By broadly interpreting the word “member” in §14(b), the Sweeney 
majority expands the scope of right to work laws, and directly harms the unions. A more rigid 
approach in construing “member” in NLRA §14(b) would prevent the unions preemption from 
collecting representation related fees from nonmembers.  
If the Supreme Court adopts such an interpretation, then unions could immediately 
collect representational fees. As previously explained, unions and employees do not share any 
special relationship that is rooted in history or tradition. Although unions are not needed to 
prevent sweat shops, their protective services are still needed to ensure that workers receive 
necessary benefits. Today, employers are trying to cut costs by reducing medical coverage and 
reducing jobs.210 Unions are needed to collectively represent employees who are threatened by 
these corporate initiatives, and unions need funds to furnish their services.  
Yet, most courts invalidate the unions claim to these fees. The Supreme Court in West 
Virginia recently held that unions only have a unilateral expectation of fees from nonmembers.211  
The court focuses on the claimed property interest of unions, and states that a protected property 
interest must originate from a contract or state law.212 In Morrisey, the Supreme Court in West 
Virginia raised this “unilateral expectation of fees” argument to refute the unions claim that they 
suffered an unjust taking.213 The Morrisey majority improperly focuses on the agreement 
between the unions and employees when rejecting the unions claim to fees. Instead, the court 
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should examine the unions merits in demanding fees, and the costly consequences of rejecting 
their claim.  
In examining the unions merits to these fees, the court should circle back to the IOLTA 
trust fund cases.214 The IOLTA trust fund cases implied that an uncompensated involuntary 
transfer of funds qualifies as an unjust taking. The more proper analysis is to focus exclusively 
on the union’s losses when forced to represent nonmembers. Under this framework, Morrisey’s 
expectation analysis is discarded, and the core issue of the union’s monetary loss is highlighted. 
The union’s forced services, which result in costly monetary loss, fit perfectly under the 
framework explained in Brown.215 Thus, Morrisey’s expectation analysis circumvents the Brown 
analysis which focuses on monetary loss. The Supreme Court would be wise to discard the 
expectation analysis employed by Morrisey, and utilize Brown to analyze the direct harm 
incurred by unions.  
 Furthermore, lower courts generally consider the time, experience, and skill of a 
professional to be a protected property interest.216 The Supreme Court has yet to hold that 
personal services of a professional qualify as a protected property interest.217 A clarification by 
the Supreme Court would be instrumental in determining whether a union’s services to all 
employees is a property interest. If the Supreme Court holds that professional services are a valid 
property interest, the lone issue would be whether the duties of fair and exclusive representation 
preempt the unions from collecting fees. It is here where a straightforward application of Beck’s 
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holding would fit, and proper construction of the word member in NLRA §14(b) would permit 
unions to collect fees.218 
Additionally, the question persists of what is adequate compensation? The Sweeney 
majority argued that unions are justly compensated through their right to be the exclusive 
negotiator between employer and employee relations.219 The majority reasoned that the duty of 
fair representation accompanies the duty of exclusive representation, and proscribes the unions 
conduct in acting as the sole negotiator.220 As mentioned before, the duty of exclusive 
representation is a complex issue that conveys the extreme benefit of a monopoly to unions. 
However, the benefits associated with exclusive representation must be balanced against any 
burden the privilege causes the unions.  
The Sweeney majority explicitly acknowledged a burden the combination of both 
exclusive representation and the duty of fair representation inflict harm upon unions. Judge 
Tinder explains that because federal law imposes a duty of fair representation, Indiana’s right to 
work statute in question did not “take” property from the unions.221 Rather, the duty of fair 
representation only precluded the union from receiving fees during their performance of the duty. 
Thus, Judge Tinder posits that the federal duty of fair representation is to blame, and not 
Indiana’s right to work law.222 
Judge Tinder may be correct in assigning the blame to the interaction between exclusive 
representation and fair representation as the culprits for the unions precarious situation.223 But, 
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Judge Tinder states that unions are properly compensated through their right to be the exclusive 
negotiator to avoid grappling with these federal mandates.224  Here, the majority fails to uphold 
the unions protected property rights and promotes the “free-rider” system. Exclusive 
representation fails to serve as adequate compensation because unions are still left without any 
monetary compensation. Moreover, the Sweeney majority fails to address how the perceived 
compensation through exclusive representation offsets the unions monetary loss.225 Permitting a 
system where unions spend thousands of dollars in representation is unjust. The presence of 
federal mandates takes the power to remedy the situation away from the state courts. Thus, the 
Supreme Court must remedy the confusion, and allow the unions to receive proper remedy.  
Fortunately, state courts are trending in the direction that provides a recourse for unions. 
First, Judge Wood’s dissent states that the Sweeney majority enforced an unconstitutional 
confiscation that is perpetuated by the American labor law system.226 Here, Judge Wood 
describes how there are alternatives to the labor law system utilized by the United States, where 
individuals can form members-only unions to collectively bargain.227 The duty of exclusive 
representation intercedes on the viability of a members-only system.228 As explained before, 
Judge Wood focuses on the majority’s construction of the word “member” in NLRA §14(b).229 
Yet, Judge Wood digresses and explains that if her critique is wrong, then a constitutional 
problem exists in labor law jurisprudence. Here, Judge Wood says that Congress always has the 
option to change the labor law, but that is unlikely to occur.230  
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Although Judge Wood directly references Congress in her dissent, she implicitly calls 
upon the Supreme Court to clarify the definition of the word “member” in NLRA §14(b).231 If 
the Supreme Court distinguished union members from nonmembers under §14(b) scrutiny, then 
the Beck analysis could be applied in a straightforward manner. Instead, the Sweeney majority’s 
“financial core” analysis of the word “membership” persists, which prevents the Beck analysis 
from having an impact.232 
Judge Wood’s dissent is met with growing popularity, as a Wisconsin State court adopted 
her reasoning verbatim when addressing a local right to work statute.233 The 14th Circuit of 
Wisconsin sought to tackle the free-rider issue.234 The court adopted Judge Wood’s critiques of 
the exclusive representation labor law system, and her rejection that unions are adequately 
compensated through exclusive representation.235 Unfortunately, this Wisconsin holding is not 
controlling because it was stayed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.236 At the time of this 
article, it is unclear whether this holding will be binding in the 14th Circuit of Wisconsin. Yet, 
Wisconsin’s attempted incorporation of Judge Wood’s dissent validates her viewpoint, and 
displays that other states seek to take a similar approach.  
Additionally, this Takings Clause issue was recently highlighted in a West Virginia state 
court, which recognized the unions harm in receiving no reimbursement for their services.237 The 
court explained that although the state has an interest in shielding workers from forced 
membership into unions, that interest does not outweigh the burden on a unions provision of free 
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services to nonmembers.238 The growing popularity of Judge Wood’s argument produces a 
tension among the courts in right to work states. Lower courts attempt to implement concepts 
from Judge Wood’s dissent, but their efforts are stonewalled. This stonewalling is a result of the 
courts upholding the exclusive representation labor law system engrained in America. Judge 
Wood, along with a growing number of lower courts, recognize that unions have a legally 
protectable interest in their resources, and are entitled to compensation for their expensive 
services.   
Supporters of Judge Wood and the various lower courts argue that the exclusive 
representation system must be abolished. Catherine Fisk, a professor at UC Irvine School of 
Law, and Benjamin Sachs, a law professor at Harvard, make the argument for an alternative 
labor system.239 Here, the two professors echo the sentiments expressed by Judge Wood’s 
dissent, and then explain how abandoning the exclusive representation system is an adequate 
solution.240 Abandoning the system of exclusive representation would make it difficult for 
nonmembers because they may end up with different working conditions than union members.241 
Thus, the authors believe that such an extreme reform would entice nonmembers to pay unions 
for their services.242 
Turning away from the exclusive representation system would force nonmembers into a 
bind, but it is an extreme solution that is unnecessary. Instead, redefining the term “member” 
under NLRA §14(b) provides a more feasible, and just as effective remedy to the free rider 
problem posed by right to work statutes. Providing a direct method for the Beck analysis to take 
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control will form a clear system, where nonmembers will be on notice of situations where they 
are obligated to pay unions. Additionally, unions will know when they can expect to be 
compensated, and when they should only expect payment from nonmembers. To provide a 
clearer system, the Supreme Court must step in and recognize the unions services to 
nonmembers as a protected property interest.  
IV. Conclusion 
 The majority in Morrisey stated that “no other appellate court in this country has 
examined a Takings challenge to a right to work law and accepted” it.243 Whether right to work 
laws constitute a Takings Clause issue is a rapidly developing topic. At the time of this note, no 
circuit court has adopted the principles of Judge Wood’s argument. Yet, it does appear that a 
conflict is imminent with a growing number of lower courts accepting the Sweeney dissent.  
 If faced with this issue, the Supreme Court must draw on the reasoning expressed in 
Judge Wood’s dissent, and provide unions a method to recoup funds. First, the Supreme Court 
must affirmatively recognize money as a protectable property interest. The IOLTA cases imply 
the compulsory seizure of money falls within a Takings Clause analysis. The Supreme Court 
must validate this trend, and place money within the grasp of the Takings Clause. 
Next, the Supreme Court should uphold the narrow “financial core” interpretation of the 
word “membership” in NLRA §14(b). The Supreme Court would dismiss any interpretation that 
the word “membership” should be construed per its “financial core.” Instead, an interpretation 
that rests on whether an individual’s pay dues or not is more adequate.  After providing a narrow 
construction of “membership,” the Supreme Court could then apply Beck and institute a rigid set 
of circumstances when nonmembers must pay fees. Beck holds that nonmembers are mandated to 
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pay union fees when reaping the benefits of collective bargaining or contract administration.244 
Thus, unions would be entitled to receive compensation when performing forced services 
proscribed under the federal duties of exclusive and fair representation.  
 The option of removing the duty of exclusive representation would remedy the issue, but 
it is an extreme solution. Instead, the Supreme Court is better served to construe the word 
“member” in NLRA §14(b) that permits the Beck analysis to take hold. Ruling in this manner 
will allow the principles expressed in Judge Wood’s Sweeney dissent, the 14th Circuit of 
Wisconsin, and the West Virginia state court to become active law.  
This free-rider experience enjoyed by non-members has been increasingly criticized by 
the courts. The central argument proposed by the unions is that duty to provide services without 
compensation constitutes an unjust taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.245 
Thus far, courts have held that a state’s passage of right to work laws, which in turn prohibit 
unions from being compensated for representing non-union members, does not equate to a 
Takings Clause violation.246 Yet, a state trial court in Wisconsin held in the exact opposite of the 
circuits. The Wisconsin state trial court ruled that the fees unions spend in representing non-
members in right to work states warrants compensation.247  
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